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TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
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[illegible]

Preliminary Report

U-2 RECONNAISSANCE MISSION C455C
flown 24 August 1965

BYE-35422/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Science and Technology

BYE-35422/65
CONFIDENTIAL

MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

Mission C455C, [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] was over the DRV, south,

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and southeast China for approximately two hours. It provided photographic coverage of 58 COMOR targets, a new Chinese Communist probable SAM site, and a reacting MiG-21 aircraft in flight. Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese air warning facilities tracked the U-2 continuously, except for two relatively unimportant sectors of the flight, over a period of almost six hours. Two MiG-21 aircraft evidently failed in intercept attempts due to a combination of improper vectoring and evasive action by the pilot. It has not been determined whether ^{an explosion} ~~burst~~ observed by the pilot ^{were} ~~was~~ from an ~~infrared~~ guided ~~or unguided~~ air-to-air missile (AAM) or aircraft cannon. However, no hostile AAM or surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats were reflected in the U-2's ECM systems. The only system which reacted, [in] System 13, was probably triggered in the Ning Ming area by a FIRE CAN radar and in the Svatow area by a heavy concentration of S-band radars.

See figure 1 (opposite) for the mission route and table 1 for COMOR targets covered.

BACKGROUND

Mission C455C was flown over the DRV, south and southeast China on 24 August 1965 to obtain high resolution photographic coverage of COMOR targets. COMOR requirements for South China are for weekly photography of one-fourth of the priority targets and monthly coverage of all targets.

Launched [] at 0008Z, the [] U-2 was over denied territory for approximately two hours and returned to base at 0645Z. The actual weather was reported by the pilot to be better than the predicted Category III (broken clouds). Several deviations from the planned route ^{were} ~~was~~ made as the result of evasive action taken following attempted intercepts by Chinese Communist MiG-21's.

25X15X1

ANALYTICAL FINDINGS

AIR DEFENSE REACTIONS

Radar Tracking -- Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese air warning facilities tracked the mission almost continuously during a period of almost six hours, except for two relatively unimportant sectors (the first a 21-minute period south over Taiwan and the second a 27-minute period west in the middle of the south China Sea) on the outbound leg, for a total distance of 1,950 nautical miles at a computed ground speed of 376 knots. The U-2 was initially detected at 0029Z, 21 minutes after take-off, identified as a hostile large type aircraft at 65,600 feet at 0052Z, and lost after 0630Z, 15 minutes before landing, at an altitude of less than 24,000 feet. Communist radar tracking was generally accurate, differing for the most part with the pilot's reported flight path by less than 15 nautical miles. A number of deviations, ranging from 25 to about 60 nautical miles, which took place in the flight sector between the DRV border and the Canton area, are attributable to the pilot's taking continuous evasive action about an hour and then requiring another 30 minutes to reorient himself. Communist facilities reported altitudes ranging from [] feet for the mission, while the pilot reported altitudes between [] feet. A rough comparison of reported altitudes

25X1

25X1

indicates that the Chinese Communist altitude reporting was most accurate in the sector between the DRV border and the Canton area.

Fighter Reactions -- There were seven fighter reactions, comprising at least eight aircraft, to the mission. At least five fighters were from the Ning Ming/Nanning area, and their characteristics indicated that at least three of these were MiG-21s. The pilot reported that two MiG-21s were above him and made passes at him, -- one from the left, and one from the right -- and that the one on his left fired a burst which exploded 1,000-1,500 feet in front of the U-2. He accordingly took evasive action. However, the available Comint and photographic evidence does not indicate that ~~either~~^{either} aircraft achieved the mission altitude or gained the position, altitude, and direction required to pose a serious threat of intercept. Whether due to the pilot's evasive action or incorrect vectoring, the approaches of both fighters were evidently too much from the lateral direction to be effective. No other fighter reactions posed threats to the mission at its flight altitude.

Missile Reactions -- There was no evidence of surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats to the mission in North Vietnam or China. A new probable SA-2 type site discovered adjacent to Ning Ming Airfield does not appear to have reached operational status, judging from the photography, and no SAM-associated signals were intercepted

in the vicinity of the site. Although the U-2 pilot evaluated the air burst he saw during a probable MiG-21 intercept attempt as an air-to-air missile (AAM), there were no intercepts of signals correlating with any phase of AAM operations. Although the possibility that the burst was made by an unguided or infrared-homing missile cannot be ruled out, it most probably was caused by cannon fire.

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Table 1

COMOR TARGETS COVERED BY MISSION C455C

<u>Target No.</u>	<u>Target Description</u>
	<u>China</u>
2C0045	Hsing Ning Afl'd
2C0058	Kuang Chou Pai Yun Afl'd (White Cloud)
2C0073	Liu Chou Afl'd
2C0094	Nan Hai Kuang Chou Afl'd (Fo Shan)
2C0095	Nan Ning Afl'd
2C0115	Shui Kou Afl'd (Hui Yang)
2C0129	Tan Chu Afl'd
2C0223	Nan Ning Afl'd South
2C0319	Swatow Afl'd NE (Shan Tou)
2C0906	Ning Ming Afl'd U/C
4A0032	Shan Tou Naval Base
4A0033	Huang Pu Naval Base
6B0078	Hai Feng Area Prob Electronic Instl's
6B0099	Fo Shan Area Radar Station
7A0001	Tang Chia Mil Instln (Chung Shan)
7A0002	Ning Ming Transshipment Point
7A0005	Chao An Army Bks NW
7A0020	Hui Yang Army Bks West & Ord Tpo
7A0036	Nan Ao Tao Island Mil Instl's

Table 1 continued

<u>Target No.</u>	<u>Target Description</u>
	<u>China</u>
7A1153	Liu Chou Army Bks West
7A1209	Keng Wei Army Bks North
7A1210	Shan Tou Army Barracks Lien Tang
7A1211	Kuang Chou Military Storage Area
7A1212	Ho Yuan Bks Areas
7A1229	Hang Ning Hain Hsu Army Bks
7A1232	Chang Mu Tao Army Bks West
7A1243	Kuang Chou Storage Area, Sha Ho NW
7A1244	Pi Tsun Army Bks North
7A1245	Shang Lo Tsun Supply Dpo and Bks Area
7A1248	Ping Hsiang Ord Dpo
7A1249	Hui Yang Training Area
7A1804	Kuei Hsien Army Bks
8A0001	Nan Ning Complex
8A0003	Kuang Chou Complex (Canton)
8A0028	Ping Hsiang Complex
	<u>North Vietnam</u>
2T0001	Haiphong, Cat Bi Afl'd
2T0002	Hanoi, Gai Lam Afl'd
2T0003	Kep Ha Afl'd
2T0004	Haiphong, Kien An Afl'd
2T0008	Phuc Yen New Afl'd

Table 1 continued

<u>Target No.</u>	<u>Target Description</u>
	<u>North Vietnam</u>
2T0012	Kep Ha (Phi Diem) Afla
2T0013	Lang Son Afla
4T0002	Hon Gay (Gia Chay) Naval Base
4T0003	Port Wallut Naval Base
4T0008	Cam Pha Port Facilities
6T0001	Do Son Radar Station
6T0005	Ba Mau Isle Radar Site
6T0007	Hoang Son Radar Site
7T0039	Kep Area 30 Mi Hanoi/Dong Dang RR
7T0040	Thanh Moi Area 30 Mi Hanoi/Dong Dang RR
7T0361	Loc Binh Army Supply Depot
7T0381	Tong Trieu Army Bks NE Trai Su
8T0018	Haiphong Power Plant
8T0002	Long San Complex
8T0005	Dong Dang Complex
8T0006	Phu Lang Thuong Complex
8T0009	Mon Cay Complex
8T0011	Phu Lang Thuong U, I Ind Inst

Table 2

RADARS DEPLOYED IN CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM
AND INTERCEPTED BY MISSION C455C

Early Warning

MOON CONE

SCR-270

KNIFE REST B

CROSS SLOT

Ground Control Intercept

TOKEN

BIG MESH

Height Finder

ROCK CAKE

AAA Fire Control

FIRE CAN

SOURCES

This preliminary technical evaluation of a U-2 Reconnaissance Mission flown over North Vietnam and Communist China on 24 August 1965 was developed for the 303 Committee by the following elements of the Directorate of Science and Technology:

Office of Scientific Intelligence

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